Update Sep 2013
Update April 2013
Excluding the US, rest-of-world crude production in 2H2012 was not higher than in 2005
Update Jan 2013
Incremental crude oil production update Jan 2012
Source of data: http://omrpublic.iea.org/
We can clearly see that Saudi Arabia was not able to respond to Libya’s production losses within 30 days as defined by the IEA to qualify as spare capacity. The total production loss February 2011 to July 2011 of Libya plus Saudi Arabia was 126 mb. Only half of this loss, 60 mb, was released by the IEA from strategic reserves. The report on the release dated 15/9/2011 is here: http://www.iea.org/index_info.asp?id=2074
In March 2011, global crude oil production was 73,497 kb/d, slightly below 73,784 Kb/d in March 2005, and practically the average achieved during the last 6 years, which was 73,400 kb/d. We see that the oil “saved” in decline periods (red) was more or less consumed in growth periods (dark blue). The worsening zig-zag course around the average and high oil price volatility show that the world cannot manage peak oil well. The oil war in Libya is a counterproductive response to limited oil supplies, which has exposed OPEC’s lack of spare capacity. It is one of the negative feed back loops of peak oil.
Please note that the EIA has continued publishing international crude oil data – contrary to earlier announcements – but we cannot be sure whether that will continue. Also, EIA crude oil data for 2010/11 are much higher than those from the IEA (see below)
After the Energy Information Administration (EIA, US Department of Energy) discontinued to update their international petroleum statistics, this page uses now data from the International Energy Agency (IEA, Paris) – Monthly Oil Market Report (table 3) http://omrpublic.iea.org/
We start with OPEC crude, as this is shown separately (while other countries have their natural gas liquids contained in oil)
This reduces the 2005 crude oil peak – see below the EIA data
We can clearly see what I call the Oilympic peak in July 2008 with an additional 800 kb/d from Saudi Arabia for China. Since then, OPEC production has dropped, for various reasons, by around 3 mb/d while demand, despite the temporary drop during the GFC, has remained strong.
Note that these are incremental changes since January 2001. The base production is the sum of the lowest country production data in this period. Countries with huge fluctuations like Venezuela, Iraq and now Libya feature prominently. Saudi Arabia is supposed to be a swing producer. But compare the recent slow rise in Saudi production with the fast incremental supply surge during the Iraq war.
Saudi Arabia did not increase production in February – April 2011 to compensate for Libyan oil production losses.
Comparison EIA – IEA
One cannot mix data from different organisations so the above graphs use IEA data only, back to 2001. The following graph shows the differences:
Update 22/4/2011 The EIA, International Energy Statistics, published Saudi crude oil production revisions for 2010 which are not in line with other data providers IEA, OPEC and JODI
The black curve is the March 2011 version of the EIA data, the red curve revisions done in April 2011. These are very different from the monthly reports of the
IEA (blue) http://omrpublic.iea.org/
OPEC (brown) http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/publications/338.htm
JODI database (yellow) http://www.jodidb.org/WDS/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=2411
Even before the April 2011 update EIA data tended to be too high for 2010
The latest is now:
“Immediate reductions in EIA Energy Data and Analysis Programs Necessitated by FY2011 Funding Cut”
“Terminate updates to EIA’s International Energy Statistics.”
I strongly recommend the reader saves the JPG files on this page as a historic document.
December 2010 version, updated 18/3/2011.
The graphs show only incremental crude oil production relative to January 2001 with data from http://www.eia.doe.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm
Production profiles can be stacked in many different ways, from bottom Fig 1c: decline wedge first, then peaking, Saudi Arabia,growing group, Venezuela and Iraq on top
Fig 1d: for detailed description, see http://www.crudeoilpeak.com/?p=1149
Fig 7: Details of growing group, in August 2008 BTC pipeline attack, conflict in Georgia, later technical problems in the ACG oil field. Angola, Brazil, Kazachstan and Azerbaijan are the only 4 countries who managed growth (around 600 Kb/d) since July 2008. All are dependent on offshore oil.
Fig 8: Details of OPEC
OPEC: Saudi Arabia could not produce more oil in the boom year 2008 than in 2005
We can clearly see the gradual decline of Non-OPEC after 2004, although there was a recent recovery, mainly from the US rebouncing from hurricanes. Russia and other growing countries also have helped lift the production back to its 2003- 2005 level.
Let’s now stack OPEC on top of Non-OPEC
The subsystem excluding Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Angola (which joined OPEC in December 2006) has come back to its peak level in 2005/06. And looking at the subsystem excluding Angola we see that Saudi Arabia was not able to lift production to 2005 levels. It was Russia and the growing group which did it.
We are now on the 3rd hump on the bumpy production plateau
(1) 2005, the start year of the peaking, interrupted by Katrina and followed by decline in Saudi Arabia
(2) 2008, the Oilympic peak followed by the collapse of Lehman Brothers
(3) 2010, the money printing peak, followed by unrest in North Africa and the ME
Annual crude production in 2005 and 2010 were basically on the same level but average oil prices in 2010 were 40% higher
The above graph shows a group of countries labelled “Other” in the International Petroleum Monthly